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Abstract
We consider the theoretical problem of designing an optimal adversarial attack on a decision system
that maximally degrades the achievable performance of the system as measured by the mutual informa-
tion between the degraded signal and the label of interest. This problem is motivated by the existence of
adversarial examples for machine learning classifiers. By adopting an information theoretic perspective,
we seek to identify conditions under which adversarial vulnerability is unavoidable i.e. even optimally
designed classifiers will be vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations. We present derivations of the
optimal adversarial attacks for discrete and continuous signals of interest, i.e., finding the optimal per-
turbation distributions to minimize the mutual information between the degraded signal and a signal
following a continuous or discrete distribution. In addition, we show that it is much harder to achieve
adversarial attacks for minimizing mutual information when multiple redundant copies of the input signal
are available. This provides additional support to the recently proposed “feature compression” hypothesis
as an explanation for the adversarial vulnerability of deep learning classifiers. We also report on results
from computational experiments to illustrate our theoretical results.
1 Introduction
Deep learning methods have revolutionized many data processing applications that had previously been
considered intractable such as computer vision, natural language processing and speech recognition [1–6].
However, deep learning systems have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [7,7–19]. Specifically,
it has been shown that the outputs of many deep learning systems can be manipulated with imperceptibly
small perturbations applied to the inputs [10, 16, 20–23]. We will use the term “adversarial fragility” to
describe this vulnerability to adversarial attacks.
A common theme in the previous literature is to explain adversarial fragility as a consequence of some
deficiency in practical machine learning systems with the implication that this fragility can be eliminated by
modifying the design of the system to remove the deficiency [10,16,23,24]. In this paper, we take a different
view: we consider estimation or classification problems where even the theoretically optimal decision system
is vulnerable to adversarial attack. Thus we treat adversarial fragility as a function of the statistics of the
decision problem rather than as an artifact of suboptimal design.
We define adversarial attacks as perturbations that maximally degrade the information contained in
an input signal as measured by the mutual information between the signal and the label (or quantity)
of interest, a first information-theoretically optimal attack. Note that this definition makes no reference
to a particular machine learning system. One consequence of this definition is that adversarial attacks
are inherently transferable: the reduction of mutual information caused by the adversarial attack degrades
the performance of any conceivable decision system that relies on that input signal to the system. While
adversarial attacks have been empirically shown to transfer among different machine learning systems, such
transferability is entirely unintentional and the phenomenon is not well-understood.
With our definition, we can generalize the tools of rate-distortion theory [25] to study adversarial attacks.
Rate distortion theory is a branch of information theory that studies the amount of information loss that can
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be caused by a certain amount of distortion to signal of interest, with applications to data compression. The
efficiency of the data compression is maximized when the signal distortion is chosen in such a way to maximize
the resulting information loss, thus effectively reducing the amount of information that must be preserved.
It turns out that maximizing information loss is also a good way to model what an adversarial attacker on a
decision system would seek to do. Thus the rate distortion theory provides a natural mathematical framework
to study adversarial attacks. However, different from problem settings in traditional rate distortion theory, the
adversarial attackers are not directly modifying the label (or quantity) of interest, but instead are modifying
data generated from or related to the label (or quantity) of interest.
We present a formal definition of adversarial attacks on classification or estimation algorithms as a gener-
alization of the classic rate distortion problem. We then present derivations of the optimal adversarial attacks
on two classic decision problems with constraints on the attack size: (a) estimating a vector of continuous
random variables each of which represents an independent observation of a common source variable with an
Gaussian prior distribution, and (b) estimating discrete random variables. We also consider a variant of this
problem where the adversarial attacks are limited to attacking only a subset of the variables being estimated.
One important finding from our results is that adversarial attacks are significantly less effective when a
large number of independent observations of the source variable are available. In other words, when there is
redundant information about the source data available to the decision algorithm, it can be much more robust
to attacks. Conversely, adversarial attacks can have significantly more dramatic effects when redundant
observations of the source variable are not available. This lends support to our recently proposed “feature
compression” hypothesis [11, 14] as an explanation for the adversarial fragility of deep learning systems.
Under this hypothesis, deep learning systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks because they compress
their data into a minimal number of features that contain enough information about the source data to
allow for sufficiently accurate classification under no adversarial attacks. In other words, under the “feature
compression” hypothesis, deep learning systems are systematically blind to all non-essential features even
if they may contain information relevant to the source label because this information is redundant. Such
compression is useful for generalization, but at the cost of robustness: it makes the system vulnerable to
attacks that are narrowly targeted at the minimal features it relies on. This intuition is confirmed by our
results in this paper.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
• We present a general and formal definition of adversarial attacks as an constrained optimization problem
for maximizing the information loss for a given attack size, giving an information-theoretically optimal
attack.
• We show that the optimal adversarial attack problem is a generalization of the classical rate-distortion
problem, and present characterizations of the optimal solution for both binary and Gaussian decision
problems.
• We show that adversarial attacks are significantly harder against decision systems whose inputs contain
many redundant copies of information.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally formulate our problem model in a general
setting which is further specified under different scenarios in Section 3 and 4. We give the main theoretical
results in these two sections, and present experimental results for supporting our theoretical results in Section
5.
Notations: We denote the distribution of a random variable by p(X), and the probability of a realization
of random variable X, i.e., X = x, by P (X = x). The sample space of a random variable X is denoted by
ΩX . We use Gij to denote the element of a matrix G in the i-th row and j-th column. The Tr(F) refers to
the trace of F .
2 Problem Formulation
We use random variable U to denote the quantity (or label) of interest, and use random variable X ∈ R to
denote the data generated (or called “observation synthesized”) from U . We are interested in adding random
perturbation E to X, producing random variable Y = X + E, such that the mutual information between U
2
and Y = X + E is minimized. Since adding perturbations often introduces costs, we put constraints on the
perturbation E . For example, to make the perturbation less perceptible, one can require the perturbation
to be smaller than  in the expectation of its `2 norm. The overall framework of our proposed model is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Mutual information-based framework for adversarial attacks. A data-generating (observation
synthesis) process gives X = U +W where W characterizes the noise.
Let (U,X) and (U,X,E) be jointly distributed according to distributions p(U,X) and p(U,X,E), respec-
tively. We can formulate the problem as
min
p(E|U,X)∈P
I(U ;X + E) (1)
where P is a set of admissible probability distributions. For example, if we want to restrict the perturbation
in terms of average `2 norm being smaller than a certain threshold , we have
P := {p(E|U,X) : E[‖E‖2] ≤ ,X ∈ Ω}. (2)
Lemma 2.1. If P is a convex set, the optimization problem (1) is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. (of Lemma 2.1) We will show that the I(U ;X + E) is convex with respect to p(E|U,X). From [25],
we know I(U ;X + E) is convex with respect to p(X + E|U). We can see that, if P is convex, the set of
conditional distributions for p(X + E|U) is also convex. This proves that the optimization problem (1) is a
convex optimization problem.
The convexity of the optimization problem (1) opens the door to efficiently calculating the information-
theoretically attack
3 Adversarial Attack for Full Set of Random Variables
In this section, we will consider the problem (1) in scenarios where U follows a continuous distribution, or a
discrete distribution.
3.1 The Case of Gaussian Random Variables
We first consider the problem (1) for random variables following continuous distributions, i.e., finding optimal
adversarial perturbation random variable E to minimize the mutual information between U and X+E. The
main result is presented in Theorem 3.1.
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Theorem 3.1. Suppose that random variable U ∈ R follows Gaussian distribution N (0, a2). Let random
variable W follow Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2), and be independent of U . The data X = U + W . Let D
be a non-negative number. Under the constraint that the perturbation E satisfies E{E2} ≤ D, the optimal
perturbation E that minimizes the mutual information I(U ;U +W +E), is jointly Gaussian distributed with
U and W , and has zero mean. Moreover, under the optimal distribution, the covariance matrix of (U,W,E)
is given by
F =
a2 0 x0 σ2 y
x y D
 , (3)
where (x, y) are the optimal solution to the following optimization problem (4), i.e.,
min
x, y
(a2 + x)2
a2(a2 + σ2 +D + 2y + 2x)
,
s.t.
x2
a2
+
y2
σ2
≤ D. (4)
In addition, the smallest achievable mutual information is given by − 12 log
(
1− (a2+x)2a2(a2+σ2+D+2y+2x)
)
.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.1) Let us assume that F is the covariance matrix of (U,W,E), then the covariance
matrix of (U +W + E,U) is given by
G =
[
a2 + σ2 +D + 2y + 2x a2 + x
a2 + x a2
]
. (5)
Define Z = U − G21G11 (U +W + E). Then the variance of Z is given by var(Z) = G22 − G21G11G12. Then we
have the following argument:
I(U +W + E;U) = h(U)− h(U |U +W + E)
= h(U)− h(Z|U +W + E)
≥ h(U)− h(Z)
≥ h(U)− h(Zg)
=
1
2
log(2piea2)− 1
2
log(2pie(G22 −G21G−111 G12))
=
1
2
log(2piea2)− 1
2
log
(
2pie
(
a2 − (a
2 + x)2
a2 + σ2 +D + 2y + 2x
))
= −1
2
log
(
1− (a
2 + x)2
a2(a2 + σ2 +D + 2y + 2x)
)
,
where Zg is a Gaussian random variable with the same mean and variance as those of Z, and we used the
fact that the maximum value of h(Z) is achieved when Z follows the Gaussian distribution.
Moreover, when (U, V,W ) are zero-mean jointly Gaussian with covariance matrix F , the mutual informa-
tion between I(U ;U +W + E) can achieve − 12 log
(
1− (a2+x)2a2(a2+σ2+D+2y+2x)
)
. The smallest achievable value
of I(U ;U +W + E) is thus given by the following optimization problem:
min
x, y
− 1
2
log
(
1− (a
2 + x)2
a2(a2 + σ2 +D + 2y + 2x)
)
, (6)
s.t.
a2 0 x0 σ2 y
x y D
 < 0. (7)
By the Schur complement, the condition that F < 0 is equivalent to x2a2 +
y2
σ2 ≤ D. From the monotonicity
of − 12 log(1− x) in x, the solution minimizing the objective function in (6) will also be the minimizer of the
objective function (4).
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Theorem (3.1) characterizes the optimal adversarial perturbation E for minimizing the mutual information
between U +W + E and the Gaussian random variable U , i.e., the optimal E must follow a joint Gaussian
distribution with source U and random noise W . In addition, it provides a feasible way to compute the
distribution of E, and to compute the minimum achievable mutual information achieved, i.e., by solving the
optimization problem (4).
3.2 Linear Projections of Gaussian Random Variables
In this section, we consider the case where the quantity of interest is a Gaussian random vector U ∈ Rm,
and the data generating process is modeled by linear projections. We show that as the dimensionality of
the projected space increases, the minimized mutual information under a given attack budget can increase.
Since the linear projection can be interpreted as creating multiple copies of the original source U , this implies
that adding redundant copies better preserves the mutual information under adversarial attacks, and makes
it harder for the attacker to perform adversarial attacks. The result is presented in Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. Let U1, U2, · · · , and Um ∈ R be m independent Gaussian random variables each following
Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). Let X = HU , where H ∈ Rn×m is a given matrix, and U = [U1 U2 · · · Um]T .
Let Y = HU +E be the input data to decision systems, where E is the perturbation. Let k be the rank of H,
and let σ1, σ2,..., and σk be the singular values of matrix H. Suppose H has a singular value decomposition
H = QCV T , where Q ∈ Rn×k, C ∈ Rk×k, V ∈ Rm×k, and C is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements
are σ1, σ2,..., and σk.
Consider a perturbation budget D ≤∑ki=1 σi such that E[‖E‖2] ≤ D. Then there exists a positive number
τ such that
Di =
{
σ2i , σ
2
i ≤ τ,
τ, σ2i ≥ τ
,
k∑
i=1
Di = D.
The smallest objective value (mutual information) of optimization problem(1) is given by
I(U ;Y ) =
1
2
k∑
i=1
log
(
σ2i
Di
)
. An optimal perturbation E∗ which achieves this smallest mutual information I(U ;Y ) is given by E∗ = QΛ,
where Λ ∈ Rk is a vector of k independent Gaussian random variables following the distribution N (0, GΛ) with
GΛ being a diagonal matrix with D1, · · · , Dk on the diagonal. Moreover, Λi is chosen such that (σiV Ti U−Λi)
is independent of Λi, where Vi is the i-th column of V .
Under a perturbation budget D such that D ≥∑ki=1 σi, the smallest achievable mutual information is 0,
and an optimal perturbation is taking E∗ = −HU.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.2) Without loss of generality, we assume n ≤ m, and we will show Theorem 3.2 for
Ui ∼ N (0, σ2) . Then U ′ := V TU performs a (projected) rotation of U via matrix V , and each element
of U ′ := V TU follows the same distribution as elements in U , i.e., U ′ ∼ N (0, σ2I) where I is an identity
matrix of dimension k × k. Moreover, U ′′ := CV TU is a vector following the k dimensional joint Gaussian
distribution, i.e., U ′′ = [σ1U ′1, σ2U
′
2, · · · , σkU ′k]T ∼ N (0, GU ′′) where
G(U ′′) =

σ21σ
2 0 · · · 0
0 σ22σ
2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · σ2kσ2
 .
To minimize the mutual information between U and HU+E, we need to minimize the mutual information
between U ′′ and U ′′+QTE. The constraint that E[‖E‖2] ≤ D translates to the constraint that E[QTE] ≤ D.
From Theorem 10.3.3 in [25], we know the smallest possible mutual information I(U ′′;U ′′ + QTE) is given
by
I(U ;HU + E) = I(U ′′;U ′′ +QTE) =
k∑
i=1
1
2
log
σ2i σ
2
Di
, (8)
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where
Di =
{
τ, τ < σ2i σ
2,
σ2i σ
2, τ ≥ σ2i σ2,
(9)
and τ is chosen such that
∑k
i=1Di = D. We can first design the optimal adversarial attack Λ ∈ Rk for U ′′,
and then perform the same rotation Q (as U ′′ goes through) to get the E = QΛ. From [25], we know the
optimal Λ should follow N (0, GΛ), thus the optimal E = QΛ. By taking σ2 = 1, we get Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2 gives the minimal mutual information that can be achieved by an adversarial perturbation
E under the power constraint, and also characterizes the optimal perturbation an adversary can find. The
minimal mutual information measures the amount of damage the adversary can make to the decision of the
system, e.g., reducing the confidence of classification task held by deep learning agents or even fool them
to make totally wrong classifications. The assignment of distortion budget Di for adversarial perturbation
distribution E has similar flavor as the water-filling interpretation in information theory [25]. However, we
use a linear transformation for source message U in hope that the system decision will be more difficult to
be compromised by the adversaries.
3.2.1 Falling Bar Algorithm
We now propose a simple algorithm, which we call “falling bar” algorithm, for determining τ and Di in
Algorithm 1. We set the initial bar τ to be very big so that all the values σ2i is below the theshold. If the
total quantity below the threshold is too big and larger than the capacity D, then we decrease the bar τ so
that less quantity is smaller than the . This process repeats until we find the appropriate bar τ . Assume σi
is the i-th largest singular values of H, and we define an interval
Ri =

[σ2i+1,+∞), i = 0
[σ2i+1, σ
2
i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,
(−∞, σ2k), i = k.
(10)
Algorithm 1 Falling bar algorithm for determining τ and Di.
1: Input: distribution of Ui ∼ N )(0, 1), H ∈ Rn×m and D ∈ [0, ‖H‖2F ].
2: Output: Di, i = 1, · · · , k and τ .
3: Compute singular values of H, i.e., σi, i = 1, · · · , k and construct intervals Ri, i = 0, · · · , k.
4: for i = 0, 1, · · · , k do
5: if i = 0 then
6: if
∑k
i=1 σ
2
i = D then
7: Choose τ to be any value greater than σ21 , and Di = σ
2
i , i = 1, · · · , k
8: Break
9: end if
10: else
11: Compute τ =
D−∑kj=i+1 σ2j
i
12: if τ ∈ Ri then
13: Compute Dj =
{
τ, j = 1, 2, · · · , i,
σ2j , j = i+ 1, i+ 2, · · · , k
14: Break
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
18: Return τ and Di, i = 1, · · · , k.
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3.3 Adversarial Attacks of Binary Symmetric Channel
We now consider adversarial attacks on information communicated via discrete random variable, which has
similar flavor as the binary symmetric channel in communication. The joint distribution p(U,X) of (U,X)
is defined over {0, 1} × {0, 1}, and we denote the probabilities P(U = 0, X = 0),P(U = 0, X = 1),P(U =
1, X = 0),P(U = 1, X = 1) by a, b, c, and d, respectively. The distribution p(E|U,X) of E conditioning on
(U,X) is defined over {0, 1}, and we denote by p1, p2, p3, and p4 the following probabilities respectively
P(Y = 1|U = 0, X = 0) = P(E = 1|U = 0, X = 0),
P(Y = 0|U = 0, X = 1) = P(E = 1|U = 0, X = 1),
P(Y = 1|U = 1, X = 0) = P(E = 1|U = 1, X = 0),
P(Y = 0|U = 1, X = 1) = P(E = 1|U = 1, X = 1),
(11)
where we use the definition Y =: X+E, and the addition is modular over 2. The overall scheme is illustrated
in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Illustration of binary symmetric channel: the source U and the synthesizedX are jointly distributed.
From Figure 2, the joint distribution of (U, Y ) or (U,X + E) is
P(U = 0, Y = 1) = ap1 + b(1− p2),
P(U = 0, Y = 0) = a(1− p1) + bp2,
P(U = 1, Y = 0) = c(1− p3) + dp4,
P(U = 1, Y = 1) = cp3 + d(1− p4),
(12)
the marginal distribution p(U) of U is
P(U = 0) = a+ b,P(U = 1) = c+ d, (13)
and the marginal distribution p(Y ) of Y is
P(Y = 0) = a(1− p1) + bp2 + c(1− p3) + dp4,P(Y = 1) = ap1 + b(1− p2) + cp3 + d(1− p4). (14)
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We will denote P(Y = 0) by A. From (12), (13) and (14), we can compute the mutual information as follows
I(U ;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |U)
= H(Y )− P(U = 0)H(Y |U = 0)− P(U = 1)H(Y |U = 1)
= (a(1− p1) + bp2 + c(1− p3) + dp4) log
(
1
a(1− p1) + bp2 + c(1− p3) + dp4
)
+ (ap1 + b(1− p2) + cp3 + d(1− p4)) log
(
1
ap1 + b(1− p2) + cp3 + d(1− p4)
)
− (a+ b)
[
a(1− p1) + bp2
a+ b
log
a+ b
a(1− p1) + bp2 +
ap1 + b(1− p2)
a+ b
log
a+ b
ap1 + b(1− p2)
]
− (c+ d)
[
c(1− p3) + dp4
c+ d
log
c+ d
c(1− p3) + dp4 +
cp3 + d(1− p4)
c+ d
log
c+ d
cp3 + d(1− p4)
]
= I1(p1, p2, p3, p4) + I2(p1, p2, p3, p4)− (a+ b)I3(p1, p2)− (c+ d)I4(p3, p4), (15)
where we use the conditional distribution p(Y |U), i.e.,
P(Y = 0|U = 0) = a(1−p1)+bp2a+b ,
P(Y = 1|U = 0) = ap1+b(1−p2)a+b ,
P(Y = 0|U = 1) = c(1−p3)+dp4c+d ,
P(Y = 1|U = 1) = cp3+d(1−p4)c+d ,
(16)
and define
I1(p1, p2, p3, p4) := (a(1− p1) + bp2 + c(1− p3) + dp4) log
(
1
a(1−p1)+bp2+c(1−p3)+dp4
)
,
I2(p1, p2, p3, p4) := (ap1 + b(1− p2) + cp3 + d(1− p4)) log
(
1
ap1+b(1−p2)+cp3+d(1−p4)
)
,
I3(p1, p2) :=
[
a(1−p1)+bp2
a+b log
a+b
a(1−p1)+bp2 +
ap1+b(1−p2)
a+b log
a+b
ap1+b(1−p2)
]
,
I4(p3, p4) :=
[
c(1−p3)+dp4
c+d log
c+d
c(1−p3)+dp4 +
cp3+d(1−p4)
c+d log
c+d
cp3+d(1−p4)
]
.
Thus, by using natural base for the logarithmic function, we have
∂I1(p1, p3, p3, p4)
∂p
=

(−a) log
(
1
a(1−p1)+bp2+c(1−p3)+dp4
)
+ (−1)(−a)
b log
(
1
a(1−p1)+bp2+c(1−p3)+dp4
)
+ (−1)b
(−c) log
(
1
a(1−p1)+bp2+c(1−p3)+dp4
)
+ (−1)(−c)
d log
(
1
a(1−p1)+bp2+c(1−p3)+dp4
)
+ (−1)d
 , (17)
∂I2(p1, p3, p3, p4)
∂p
=

a log
(
1
ap1+b(1−p2)+cp3+d(1−p4)
)
+ (−1)a
(−b) log
(
1
ap1+b(1−p2)+cp3+d(1−p4)
)
+ (−1)(−b)
c log
(
1
ap1+b(1−p2)+cp3+d(1−p4)
)
+ (−1)c
(−d) log
(
1
ap1+b(1−p2)+cp3+d(1−p4)
)
+ (−1)(−d)
 , (18)
∂I3(p1, p2)
∂p
=

a
a+b log
P(Y=0|U=0)
P(Y=1|U=0)
b
a+b log
P(Y=1|U=0)
P(Y=0|U=0)
0
0
 , (19)
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and
∂I3(p1, p2)
∂p
=

0
0
c
a+b log
P(Y=0|U=1)
P(Y=1|U=1)
d
a+b log
P(Y=1|U=1)
P(Y=0|U=1)
 . (20)
To perform adversarial attack, we propose to minimize I(U ;Y ) in (15) over p(E|U,X) under distortion
constraint, i.e.,
min
p1,p2,p3,p4∈[0,1]
I(U ;Y ), s.t. ap1 + bp2 + cp3 + dp4 ≤ . (21)
From Section 2, we know (21) is convex. In Theorem 3.3, we give the necessary optimality conditions for
the optimal solution to (21).
Theorem 3.3. Let p∗ = [p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3, p
∗
4]
T ∈ [0, 1]4 be the optimal solution of problem (21), then there must
exist a λ∗ ≥ 0 such that
ap∗1 + bp
∗
2 + cp
∗
3 + dp
∗
4 ≤ , (22)

a
(
log P
∗(Y=0)P∗(Y=1|U=0)
P∗(Y=1)P∗(Y=0|U=0) + λ
∗
)
= 0,
b
(
log P
∗(Y=1)P∗(Y=0|U=0)
P∗(Y=0)P∗(Y=1|U=0) + λ
∗
)
= 0,
c
(
log P
∗(Y=0)P∗(Y=1|U=1)
P∗(Y=1)P∗(Y=0|U=1) + λ
∗
)
= 0,
d
(
log P
∗(Y=1)P∗(Y=0|U=1)
P∗(Y=0)P∗(Y=1|U=1) + λ
∗
)
= 0,
(23)
and
λ∗(ap∗1 + bp
∗
2 + cp
∗
3 + dp
∗
4 − ) = 0, (24)
where the probability P∗(·) is computed using p∗. Furthermore, if both a and b are nonzero, or both c and d
are zero, then λ∗ = 0. Moreover, if none of a, b, c, d is zero, we have
P∗(Y = 0|U = 0)
P∗(Y = 1|U = 0) =
P∗(Y = 0|U = 1)
P∗(Y = 1|U = 1) =
P∗(Y = 0)
P∗(Y = 1)
. (25)
Proof. (of Theorem 3.3) We can get the Lagrangian of (21) as
L(p, λ) = I(U ;Y ) + λ(ap1 + bp2 + cp3 + dp4 − ), (26)
and from (17), (18), (19), and (20), we have the partial derivatives as
∂L(p,λ)
∂p1
= a
(
log P(Y=0)P(Y=1|U=0)P(Y=1)P(Y=0|U=0) + λ
)
,
∂L(p,λ)
∂p2
= b
(
log P(Y=1)P(Y=0|U=0)P(Y=0)P(Y=1|U=0) + λ
)
,
∂L(p,λ)
∂p3
= c
(
log P(Y=0)P(Y=1|U=1)P(Y=1)P(Y=0|U=1) + λ
)
,
∂L(p,λ)
∂p4
= d
(
log P(Y=1)P(Y=0|U=1)P(Y=0)P(Y=1|U=1) + λ
)
.
(27)
From the KKT conditions [26], we have for an optimal solution p∗ ∈ [0, 1]4, there must exist a λ∗ ≥ 0 such
that
ap∗1 + bp
∗
2 + cp
∗
3 + dp
∗
4 ≤ , λ∗(ap∗1 + bp∗2 + cp∗3 + dp∗4 − ) = 0 (28)
and
∂L(p∗, λ∗)
∂p1
= 0,
∂L(p∗, λ∗)
∂p2
= 0,
∂L(p∗, λ∗)
∂p3
= 0,
∂L(p∗, λ∗)
∂p4
= 0. (29)
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Thus, we proved the first part of Theorem 3.3.
When both a and b are nonzero, we have from (23)
log
P∗(Y = 1|U = 0)
P∗(Y = 0|U = 0) = −λ
∗ − log P
∗(Y = 0)
P∗(Y = 1)
, log
P∗(Y = 0|U = 0)
P∗(Y = 1|U = 0) = −λ
∗ + log
P∗(Y = 0)
P∗(Y = 1)
, (30)
or
log
P∗(Y = 1|U = 0)
P∗(Y = 0|U = 0) = −λ
∗ − log P
∗(Y = 0)
P∗(Y = 1)
, log
P∗(Y = 1|U = 0)
P∗(Y = 0|U = 0) = λ
∗ − log P
∗(Y = 0)
P∗(Y = 1)
, (31)
thus λ∗ = 0, and
P∗(Y = 1|U = 0)
P∗(Y = 0|U = 0) =
P∗(Y = 1)
P∗(Y = 0)
. (32)
Similarly for the case where both c and d are nonzero, we can get
P∗(Y = 1|U = 1)
P∗(Y = 0|U = 1) =
P∗(Y = 1)
P∗(Y = 0)
. (33)
When none of a, b, c, d is zero, we get the above two equations, and thus (25).
Theorem 3.3 characterizes the distribution of Y that is achieved by the optimal adversarial perturbation
E. Theorem 3.3 implies that when D is large enough, the optimal E should achieve a distribution for Y
which is independent of the source U , e.g., P∗(Y = 0) = P∗(Y = 0|U = 0) = P∗(Y = 1|U = 0). This means
a zero mutual information, which coincides with the intuition in rate distortion theory, i.e., a big enough
distortion D can lead to zero rate.
4 Adversarial Attacks Over Subset of Random Variables
In this section, we consider the problem of information-theoretically optimal adversarial attacks over subset
of random variables where the attacker can attack only a given small number of outputs. For this problem,
we will derive the optimal attacking strategies to minimize the mutual information between U ∈ Rm and
Y = X+E = U+E ∈ Rm under sparse attacks over a subset of random variables indexed by T ⊂ {1, 2, · · · ,m}
and |T | = k < m.
We assume (U,X) ∼ p(U,X), and the attacker picks a fixed subset of random variables XT ∈ R|T | which
consists of elements from X as indexed by T , and the attacker can arbitrarily change the output of them by
designing ET ∈ R|T | or p(ET |U,X). This can be formulated as follows
min
T⊂[m],p(ET |U,X)
I(U ;U + E)
s.t. ET = 0, (34)
where [m] is defined as {1, 2, · · · ,m}, T is the complement of the set of attacked sensors, and p(ET |U,X) is
an arbitrary valid distribution. Under this formulation, we have characterizations of the optimal attack as
stated in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. Let U ∈ Rm follow Gaussian distribution N (0,Σ) where
Σ =

σ21 0 · · · 0
0 σ22 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · σ2m.

Under the attack formulation (34), the minimum mutual information will be
I(U ;U + E∗) =
1
2
log
(
(2pie)|T
∗||ΣT∗ |
)
, (35)
where T ∗ is the index set such that the submatrix of Σ with rows specified by T ∗ and columns specified by T ∗
has the smallest determinant.
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Proof. (of Theorem 4.1) From the properties of mutual information and different entropy, we have
I(U ;U + E) = h(U)− h(U ;U + E) (36)
=
m∑
i=1
h(Ui|U1, U2, · · · , Ui−1)−
m∑
i=1
h(Ui|U + E,U1, U2, · · · , Ui−1) (37)
= I1 + I2, (38)
where we define I1 and I2 as
I1 =
∑
i=T
(h(Ui|U1, U2, · · · , Ui−1)− h(Ui|U + E,U1, U2, · · · , Ui−1))
and
I2 =
∑
i=T
(h(Ui|U1, U2, · · · , Ui−1)− h(Ui|U + E,U1, U2, · · · , Ui−1)).
Without loss of generality, we assume the index set T to be T := {i1, i2, · · · , ik} ⊂ [m] with i1 < i2 <
· · · < ik. Thus, T = [m] \ T := {s1, s2, · · · , sm−k} with s1 < s2 < · · · < sm−k. Since
I1 ≥
∑
j∈[k]
(h(Uij |Ui1 , Ui2 , · · · , Uij−1)− h(Uij |UT + ET , Ui1 , Ui2 , · · · , Uij−1))
=
∑
j∈[k]
h(Uij |Ui1 , Ui2 , · · · , Uij−1)−
∑
j∈[k]
h(Uij |UT + ET , Ui1 , Ui2 , · · · , Uij−1))
= h(UT )− h(UT |UT + ET )
= I(UT ;UT + ET ) (39)
where the first inequality holds due to the independence of elements of U and the fact that conditioning
reduces the differential entropy. From Theorem 3.1, I1 can achieve 0 by appropriately choosing p(ET |UT ).
Note that I(UT ;UT +ET ) actually corresponds to the vector form of that in Theorem 3.1 without considering
noise W . Similarly, we have from [25]
I2 ≥
∑
j∈[m−k]
(h(Usj |Us1 , Us2 , · · · , Usj−1)− h(Usj |UT + ET , Us1 , Us2 , · · · , Usj−1)) (40)
= h(UT )− h(UT |UT + ET ) (41)
= h(UT ) (42)
=
1
2
log
(
(2pie)|T ||ΣT
)
. (43)
Thus
I(U ;U + E) = I1 + I2 ≥ 1
2
log
(
(2pie)|T ||ΣT
)
,
and the minimum mutual information is achieved when T ∗ is the index set which contains the smallest m−k
diagonal elements of Σ.
Theorem 4.1 actually implies that when the attacker can only attack over a subset of the random variables
with size k arbitrarily, he/she should attack the k random variables with the largest variances. This also
coincides with the intuition in rate distortion theory.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we provide empirical results to validate our theoretical claims. In the first set of ex-
periments, we consider the adversarial attacks via mutual information minimization (4) in the general
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Gaussian case where the source distribution is Gaussian with zero mean. We take the variance a2 of
U ∼ N (0, a2) to be different values, i.e., a2 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 0.9}, and similarly for σ2 of W ∼ N (0, σ2), i.e.,
σ2 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. For each pair of a2, σ2, we empirically show how the mutual
information changes with the distortion D when D takes value from {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}.
For each group of (a2, σ2, D), we generate meshgrid for x ∈ [−
√
a2D,
√
a2D] and y ∈ [−
√
σ2D,
√
σ2D], and
the get all the grid points satisfying the constraint. We then find from these grid points the poin which
achieves the minimal mutual information. The results are presented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Minimum mutual information under different distortion budgets.
From the results, we can see that for fixed source variance a2 and random noise variance σ2, the mu-
tual information decreases monotonically with respect to distortion D. Besides, to achieve a zero mutual
information, i.e., no information can be conveyed about label U , the magnitude of the distortion should be
comparable to the source variance. For example, when a2 = 1, the distortion needs to be larger than 0.9
so that an almost zero mutual information can be achieved regardless of the noise variance. Moreover, the
adversarial perturbation E can cause more damage to reduce the mutual information than the random noise
W does. For example, in the case where a2 = 0.75 and D = 0.1, the mutual information decreases from 0.6
to 0.2 as the noise variance increases from 0.1 to 1. However, in the case where a2 = 0.75 and σ2 = 0.1, the
mutual information can decreases from 0.6 to 0 as distortion increases from 0.1 to 1.
In the second set of experiments, we demonstrate the performance of attacking the multiple Gaus-
sian copies with linear projection based on Theorem 3.2. We take m to be different values, i.e., m ∈
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{10, 50, 250, 1250}, and the n will take αm with α taking different values, i.e., α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, · · · , 0.9} for fat
projection matrix, and α ∈ {1.1, 1.2, · · · , 1.9} for tall projection matrix. For each pair of (m,α), the projection
matrix H ∈ Rn×m is generated randomly with elements i.i.d. according to N (0, 1m ). Then, we compute the
minimal mutual information for a given D which can take values in {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}×∑
i σ
2
i . The results are presented in Figure 4 and 5.
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Figure 4: Minimum mutual information under different distortion budgets in Gaussian multiple-copies case:
n < m.
From the results, we can see that as the distortion increases up to the sum of the squared singular values
of the projection matrix, the mutual information can go to zero. It also shows that for a given distortion
D, when the dimensionality of the space to which the source U ∈ Rm is projected increases, the mutual
information will also increase, meaning that an adversarial attack on the mutual information is more difficult
to achieve. Besides, this improved robustness is more obvious for fat projection matrix with n < m. For
example, in the case where m = 50 and D = 2.5, and the matrix is fat, increasing n/m from 0.1 to 0.9 gives
an increase in mutual information from about 6 to about 120, i.e., 1900% improvement. While in the case
where m = 50 and D = 2.5, as n/m increases from 1.1 to 1.9, the mutual information increases from about
150 to 200, i.e., 33% improvement. However, no matter what type the matrix is, the mutual information
increases monotonically with respect to the increase of n, which provides empirical evidence for our analysis
in Section 3.2.
We now present empirical results for minimizing mutual information (21) in the binary symmetric channel
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Figure 5: Minimum mutual information under different distortion budgets in Gaussian multiple-copies case:
n ≥ m.
case. For each source distribution a, b, c, d, we minimize the mutual information I(U ;Y ) in (15) with respect
to conditional distribution p(E|U,X) where Y = X + E and the addition is modular over 2. Due to the
small scale of the problem, we can adopt a grid search method to find the optimal distribution p1, p2, p3, p4,
i.e., constructing a 4D cube [0, 1]4 and drawing 100 equally spacing lines along each dimension to obtain a
gridded cube which has 108 points. We first perform distortion check to remove those points which may
violate the distortion constraint, and then find the optimal solution from the rest points whose indices are
the optimal distribution. We consider different source distributions, e.g., [a, b, c, d] = [0.45, 0.05, 0.05, 0.45],
[0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.4], [0.3, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3], and [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25]. For each source distribution, we find the mini-
mal mutual information for given distortion budget D. The results are shown in Figure 6.
From the results, we can see that when the source joint distribution of (U,X) is highly concentrated or
uniform, we need very small distortion to reduce the mutual information to be 0. For example, in Figure
6b, when P(U = 0, X = 0) = 0.94, we only need about 0.05 distortion to set the mutual information to be
0. In Figure 6c, when P(X = 0|U = 0) + P(X = 1|U = 0) = 0.94, there is almost no mutual information
between U and X + E even for distortion close to 0. In Figure 6a, when the source joint distribution is
uniform, the mutual information is zero even for very small distortion. In the general situation, increasing
the distortion can indeed reduce the mutual information, e.g., the case where the source joint distribution is
a = 0.45, b = 0.05, c = 0.05, d = 0.45 in Figure 6a.
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Figure 6: Minimum mutual information under different distortion budgets: a−b−c−d is the joint distribution
of (U,X).
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